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Cutting Through Pennsylvania's




Pennsylvania courts have long protected patients' autonomy in
making decisions regarding their health care.1 Emboldened in this
principle is a physician's duty to obtain a patient's informed
consent before treatment.2 Traditionally, the physician's duty to
inform a patient of the risks and alternatives of treatment has been
limited to surgical procedures.3 Consequently, under Pennsylva-
nia's common law doctrine, there has been no duty to obtain
consent for non-invasive medical procedures.4
On November 26, 1996, in an effort to control the escalating
costs of malpractice insurance,5 Pennsylvania's General Assembly
passed legislation expanding and codifying the common law
doctrine of informed consent.6 In December of 1997, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court steadfastly refused to expand the common
law doctrine to include non-surgical procedures. 7 In dicta, the
court acknowledged the legislature's expansion of the informed
consent doctrine; the court, however, rebuffed the statute as a
means to include previously excluded non-surgical procedures.8
This Comment analyzes Pennsylvania's informed consent
statute and offers a reasonable interpretation supportive of
1. See, e.g., Moscicki v. Shor, 163 A. 341 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1932).
2. See id.
3. See Morgan v. MacPhail, 704 A.2d 617, 619 (Pa. 1997) ("It has long been the law
in Pennsylvania that a physician must obtain informed consent from a patient before
performing a surgical or operative procedure.").
4. See id.
5. See Christopher Guadagnino, Ph.D., CAT Fund Fight Brings Historic Tort Reform
(visited Oct. 26, 1998) <http://www.physiciansnews.com/cover/1296.html>.
6. See Informed Consent, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.811-A (West Supp. 1998).
7. See Morgan, 704 A.2d at 620.
8. See id. at 620 n.6.
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expanding physicians' duty to obtain informed consent for non-
surgical procedures, thereby abolishing the traditional surgical
requirement. Part II of this Comment examines the background of
Pennsylvania's informed consent common law and statute. Within
this Part, Section A reviews the development of the common law
surgical requirement. Section B describes the codification of the
informed consent doctrine and circumstances surrounding enact-
ment of the statute. Section C summarizes the facts and reasoning
of Morgan v. MacPhail9 in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
defines the informed consent surgery requirement. This Section
also assesses the court's narrow interpretation of the statute,
thereby limiting the future application of the statute to enumerated
procedures and services.
Part III of this Comment analyzes the legislative intent
underlying the informed consent statute. Within this Part, Section
A discusses the competing theories of negligence and battery under
which the Statute may be applied. In addition, this Section
identifies the ambiguity and differing interpretations of the statute.
Section B describes the rules of statutory construction that courts
must use to resolve the ambiguity surrounding the statute. Section
C examines the statute's objective of medical malpractice cost
containment. Section D compares the informed consent statute
with other statutes and regulations protecting similar persons.
Section E posits a liberal application of the statute to effectuate the
legislative intent and to serve the public interest. Section F
introduces the principles of duty analysis to determine the extent
of physicians' duty under an expanded definition of informed
consent. Finally, Part IV of this Comment, concludes that the
informed consent statute can be reasonably interpreted to abolish
the surgical requirement.
II. Background
A. History of Pennsylvania's Informed Consent Surgical Require-
ment
In 1932, Moscicki v. Shor0 set the cornerstone of Pennsylva-
nia's surgical requirement under the medical informed consent
doctrine. In Moscicki, a dentist informed his patient that all of her
9. 704 A.2d 617 (Pa. 1997).
10. See 163 A. 341 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1932).
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teeth would need to be removed before receiving a full set of
dentures." The patient consented to have all of her teeth in the
lower jaw, as well as three abscessed upper teeth, pulled. 2 Rather
than removing only the teeth he received consent to pull, the
dentist extracted all of the patient's teeth.13 In its opinion, the
court enunciated the general rule that, in non-emergent circum-
stances, a surgeon must obtain a competent patient's informed
consent prior to a surgery.'4
Under these circumstances, Pennsylvania's doctrine of
informed consent was formulated: "[A]ny extension of the
operation by the physician without the consent of the patient or
someone authorized to speak for him constituted a battery or
trespass . .,5 Unlike a medical negligence action, 6 informed
consent is grounded in the theory that a physician's failure to
obtain a patient's informed consent constitutes a technical bat-
tery. 7 Traditionally, battery has been recognized as an individu-
al's right to be free of unwanted and harmful bodily contact. 8
Without the patient's informed consent, the physician is liable for
any injuries resulting from the touching, regardless of whether the




14. See id. (emphasis added); accord Dicenzo v. Berg, 16 A.2d 15 (Pa. 1940); Smith v.
Yohe, 194 A.2d 167 (Pa. 1963); Gray v. Grunnagle, 223 A.2d 663 (Pa. 1966).
15. See Gray v. Grunnagle, 223 A.2d 663, 667 (Pa. 1966).
16. "In medical malpractice litigation, negligence is the predominant theory of liability."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 662 (6th ed. abr. 1990). Medical negligence requires that the
plaintiff prove that her harm is a result of the physician's failure to possess or to use the
required skill and/or knowledge that a reasonable prudent provider would exercise under
similar circumstances. See id.; see also Gray, 223 A.2d at 668. The terms "medical
malpractice," "medical negligence," and "battery" can be a source of confusion and are often
interchanged. Compounding this confusion is the General Assembly's use of "medical negli-
gence" in the Declaration of Policy of the Medical Malpractice provisions of the Health Care
Services Malpractice Act, under which the informed consent statute is located. See PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.801-A (West Supp. 1998). This matter is addressed in the Analysis
section of this Comment. For purposes of consistency, "medical malpractice" encompasses
both "medical negligence" and "battery."
17. See Moscicki, 163 A. at 342 ("An operation without the consent of the patient ...
constitutes a technical assault."); accord Smith, 194 A.2d at 174; Gray, 223 A.2d at 669.
18. See Herr v. Booten, 580 A.2d 1115, 1117 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 cmt. c (1965))
19. See Cooper v. Cohen, 286 A.2d 647, 649 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971). See also Matthies
v. Mastromonaco, No. A-9 Sept. Term 1998, 1999 WL 462173 at *5 (N.J. July 8, 1999) ("The
essential difference in analyzing informed consent claims under negligence, rather than
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In 1966, Gray v. Grunnagle° completed the foundation of the
Commonwealth's surgical requirement.2 Borrowing from the
Supreme Court of North Carolina, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
traced the development of the battery theory from a time when
major surgery was performed in the patient's home.22 During
these times, the limitations of diagnostic medicine prevented the
surgeon from making an accurate diagnosis prior to the incision. 3
It was not until the patient was anesthetized and undergoing
surgery could the surgeon determine what the necessary procedure
might be.24 Because the surgery often took place at the patient's
home with the patient rendered unconscious by the shock of the
surgery, immediate family members were usually at hand to consent
to expanding the scope of the procedure.'
Framing the physician-patient relationship as contractual in
nature,26 the Gray court held that "for there to be valid consent
it must be clear that both parties understand the nature of the
undertaking and what the possible as well as the expected results
might be."27  Since the patient bears the expense, pain, and
suffering accruing to an adverse outcome, the patient has a right to
know of the inherent risks of the proposed treatment. 28 Under
battery principles, is that the analysis focuses not on an unauthorized touching or invasion
of the patient's body, but on the physician's deviation from a standard of care.").
20. 223 A.2d 663 (Pa. 1966).
21. See id. at 668-69; accord Sinclair v. Block, 633 A.2d 1137 (Pa. 1993); Morgan v.
MacPhail, 704 A.2d 617 (Pa. 1997). In Gray, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the
lower court's grant of judgement non obstante veredicto following a jury verdict that the
surgeon exceeded the scope of the patient's consent to exploratory surgery when the surgeon
proceeded to excise material surrounding the patient's spinal cord. See Gray, 223 A.2d at
665-667. Prior to the surgery, the patient suffered from muscular atrophy of the leg which
would sometimes cause his left foot to invert. See id. at 665. The surgeon failed to advise
the patient that the procedure carried a 15-20% risk of paralysis. See id. at 673. Following
the surgery, the patient was paralyzed and unable to walk. See id. at 666.
22. See Gray, 223 A.2d at 666-67 (quoting Chief Justice Barnhill in Kennedy v. Parrott,
90 S.E.2d 754 (N.C. 1956)).
23. See id. at 667.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 669 (quoting Robert E. Powell, Consent to Operation, 21 MD. L. REV. 189,
191 (1961)).
27. Gray, 223 A.2d at 674. See Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.2d 647, 650 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1971) (quoting Berkley v. Anderson, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1970) ("[A] physician's duty to
disclose is... imposed by law which governs his conduct in the same manner as others in
a similar fiduciary relationship.").
28. See Gray, 223 A.2d at 674. See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.811-A(b) (West
Supp. 1998) (essentially codifying the elements of informed consent in Gouse v. Cassel, 615
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this doctrine, a competent patient is granted the right to medical
self-determination .29
In 1971, the Pennsylvania Superior Court, in Cooper v.
Cohen,'0 interpreted Gray to imply that the primary interest of
Pennsylvania courts is to inform fully patients of all material facts
so they can make an intelligent choice of their medical treat-
ment.31 Expanding the informed consent doctrine, the court held
that "the same duty of disclosure obtains [sic] whether or not the
treatment can be technically termed operative or surgical.
32
Twenty-two years after the Superior Court's decision in
Cooper, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explicitly stated that
surgery is a requirement under the informed consent doctrine.33
In 1993, in Sinclair v. Block,3' a mother was experiencing compli-
cations during natural childbirth. Using a pair of forceps, a
physician attempted to facilitate a natural delivery by correcting the
baby's position within the mother's birth canal.36 Failing this
procedure, the baby was subsequently delivered by Caesarian
section.37  Following the birth, the baby appeared to have some
swelling on her scalp and faint marks on her forehead and face,
allegedly caused by the forceps. 3 It was later determined that the
newborn suffered from a skull fracture and seizures.
39
The family maintained that the physician's use of the forceps
constituted an operative procedure and required the mother's
A.2d 331, 333 (Pa. 1992)). Informed consent is achieved when a patient receives a
description of a medical procedure and information concerning the risks and alternatives that
a reasonably prudent person would require to make an informed decision before the
procedure. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.811-A(b).
29. See Sinclair v. Block, 633 A.2d 1137, 1140 (Pa. 1993).
30. 286 A.2d 647 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971).
31. See id. at 650. In Cooper, the patient signed a "blanket consent form" permitting
physicians to perform a non-invasive, gastroscopic examination of the patient by guiding a
semi-rigid fiberscope through the patient's mouth to photograph areas of her stomach. See
id. at 648. The scope subsequently punctured the patient's stomach. See id.
32. Id. at 649 n.2. The court found the gastroscopic procedure closely related to surgery
when it involved anesthesia and transport to a special examination room. See id.
33. See Sinclair v. Block, 633 A.2d 1137, 1139-40 (Pa. 1993) (requiring a
"surgical or operative procedure.").
34. Id.
35. See id. at 1138.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See Sinclair, 633 A.2d at 113&
39. See id.
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informed consent.40 The court, however, held that the instrument
was merely an extension of the physician's hands used in the
natural delivery process. 41 Re-iterating the surgical requirement
for obtaining informed consent, the court stated that the doctrine
presupposes that the patient has a choice to make.42  "Thus,
because labor is inevitable and there is no choice to make, the
informed consent doctrine does not apply to the natural delivery
process. ,41
B. Pennsylvania's Informed Consent Statute: Codifying the
Common Law Doctrine and Expanding Physicians' Duty
On November 26, 1996, Pennsylvania's General Assembly
unanimously amended the Health Care Services Malpractice Act
("Act").' The Act substantially codified the state's common law
doctrine of informed consent45 under which physicians had a duty
to obtain a patient's informed consent for surgery and the related
administration of anesthesia,46 insertion of a surgical device or
appliance,47 and use of experimental devices and medications.
4 8
40. See id. at 1140.
41. See id. Therefore, the physician was not required to obtain the patient's specific
consent to use the forceps, but rather the general consent to childbirth was sufficient to cover
its use. See id. at 1141.
42. See id. at 1140.
43. See Sinclair, 633 A.2d at 1141; cf. Gordon v. Bakare, 118 Dauph. 253 (Pa. Com. P.
1998) (permitting a mother's informed consent cause of action to remain when her physician
failed to explore the benefits and problems of a surgical alternative to the natural delivery
process). The Common Pleas court limited the Sinclair holding to whether the use of forceps
during delivery was a surgical procedure and not whether informed consent was relevant to
delivery of a baby. See id. at 256.
44. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1301.101-.1006 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998).
45. Prior to amendment, the Health Care Services Malpractice Act was silent as to
which procedures or treatments required a physician to obtain a patient's informed consent.
See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.103 (West 1991). The 1996 Act rewrote the definition of
informed consent and incorporated by reference PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.811-A,
enumerating those procedures requiring informed consent. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40,
§ 1301.103 (West Supp. 1998).
46. See Gray v. Grunnagle, 223 A.2d 663 (Pa. 1966) (holding that informed consent is
required for surgery); Sauro v. Shea, 390 A.2d 259, 263 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (imposing a
duty to inform patients of risks and consequences of surgery and anesthesia).
47. See Stover v. Association of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Surgeons, 635 A.2d 1047
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (holding that implantation of a mechanical heart valve required
consent); Green v. Dolsky, 685 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1996) (recognizing that informed consent under
state law may be superseded by the Food and Drug Administration's Medical Device Act
requirements to inform patients).
48. See 21 U.S.C. § 360j(g)(3)(D) (1998) (providing a federal requirement of informed
consent for the use of experimental devices on humans); 21 U.S.C. § 355(i)(4) (1998)
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In addition, the Legislature expanded this judicially created
doctrine to include medical procedures previously excluded under
the common law of informed consent.49  With codification,
physicians' informed consent duties are augmented to include
radiation, chemotherapy, and non-surgical related blood transfu-
sions.5 °
The Act was the result of a reform effort to address an
impending financial meltdown with the state's Medical Professional
Liability Catastrophe Loss (CAT) Fund.5' In 1975, the state
established the CAT Fund in response to a medical malpractice
insurance crisis.52 Factors, including the relatively small size of
Pennsylvania's insurance carriers and the length of time between
premium collection and claim payment, created a financial
uncertainty for insurers.53 At the time, insurers sought up to 200
percent premium increases to reduce the risk that a string of very
large verdicts may render companies insolvent.54 The purpose of
the CAT Fund ("Fund") was to provide affordable malpractice
insurance for all medical providers55 by removing the actuarial
uncertainty of future claims and developing a "pay-as-you-go"
system. 56  Under this system, physicians are required to pay the
(providing a federal requirement of informed consent for the use of experimental
medications).
49. See Dible v. Vagley, 612 A.2d 493, 496 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (holding that there is
no informed consent requirement for radiation treatment). But see id. at 500 (Hester, J.,
concurring/dissenting) (finding an exception to extend the informed consent doctrine to
include radiation treatment). See also Jones v. Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Med.,
813 F. Supp. 1125, 1129-30 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (explaining that a physician cannot fully inform
a patient of all material risks without also informing of risks involved in potential blood
transfusion).
50. See 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1301.811-A(a)(2)-(3) (West Supp. 1998).
51. See Guadagnino, supra note 5.
52. See Gill Taylor-Tyree, M.D., CAT Fund Fact Sheet (visited Oct. 26, 1998)
<http://www.xray.hmc.psu.edu/PRS/nov96_CATfund.html>. In the early 1970's, New York
faced similar circumstances where malpractice insurance premiums "doubled and were
threatening to triple." See Lakowitz v. CIBA Vision Corp., 632 N.Y.S.2d 845 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1995). On July 1, 1975, there was a danger that malpractice insurance would not be
available in New York. See id. In reaction, the legislature enacted the New York Public
Health Law § 2805-d (McKinney 1993) "placing novel restrictions on the doctrine of
informed consent." See id.
53. See id.
54. See id. One insurance company actually fulfilled its threat to leave the Pennsylvania
market. See id.
55. See Jeff McGaw, Malpractice Reform Bill OK'd: Lawmakers Target Frivolous
Lawsuits, Cost of Insurance, HARRISBURG PATRIOT, Nov. 21, 1996, at B5.
56. See Taylor-Tyree, supra note 52.
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Fund a surcharge based on a percentage of the insurer's premi-
um.57 In recent years, however, medical malpractice insurers have
deeply discounted premiums.58 Given the declining basis for
calculating surcharges and significantly under-funded liabilities,
59
the CAT Fund proposed a surcharge increase of 254 percent for
1997.60
Incensed by the proposed increase,61 over 2,000 supporters
marched through Harrisburg, Pennsylvania seeking medical
malpractice tort reform.62 The Legislature, concerned with the
possible exodus of physicians due to the cost of malpractice
insurance, sought to protect the interests of Pennsylvania's citizens,
communities, and professions.63 Following two weeks of intense
negotiations between the Pennsylvania Medical Society (PMS) and
the Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association (PTLA), 4 the Health
Care Services Malpractice Act was unanimously passed by the State
House and Senate and signed by Governor Ridge.65 Advocates
of the legislation maintain that the Act was a "victory for physi-
cians ... struggling with the burden of an unfairly titled medical
liability system."'
57. See id.
58. See McGaw, supra note 55.
59. See id In 1996, the CAT Fund had an estimated $1.9 billion in unfunded liabilities.
See Guadagnino, supra note 5.
60. See McGaw, supra note 55 (noting that 1995 and 1996 surcharges were 102 percent
and 164 percent of premiums, respectively).
61. See Guadagnino, supra note 5.
62. See Victor F. Greco, M.D. (President of the Pennsylvania Medical Society), My
Opinion of Act 135 (visited Oct. 26, 1998) <http://www.physiciansnews.com/discussion-
/greco.html>.
63. See S. 180-67, 2nd Legis. Sess. 2645 (Pa. 1996) (remarks of Senator Jubelirer).
Recognizing its primary obligation to ensure that patients "do not pay the price of solving
these problems," the General Assembly considered legislation to address both the CAT Fund
crisis and factors that contribute to increased malpractice expenses. See id. at 2647 (remarks
of Senator Fisher).
64. See McGaw, supra note 55.
65. See Guadagnino, supra note 5.
66. Greco, supra note 62; see also McGaw, supra note 55 (quoting Senator Michael
O'Pake: "Neither side is entirely satisfied, and what that probably means is that the average
person in Pennsylvania will be the winner today.").
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C. Morgan v. MacPhail: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
Informed Consent Surgical Definition
On December 24, 1997, in Morgan v. MacPhail,67 the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court held that the surgical requirement will
continue to remain a bar to patient remedies under the common
law doctrine of informed consent.' In October of 1988, Barbara
Morgan fell and fractured two of her ribs.69 Suffering from
continued pain two months after the fall, Mrs. Morgan sought
treatment from Dr. John MacPhail.7 ° Without her informed
consent, Dr. MacPhail performed an intercostal nerve block, a
procedure whereby a local anesthetic is injected into the area
around the ribs, 71 on Mrs. Morgan to relieve her pain.72 Follow-
ing the procedure, Mrs. Morgan began to experience weakness and
shortness of breath.73  After telephoning Dr. MacPhail, Mrs.
Morgan then went to a hospital emergency department where she
was diagnosed with a right pneumothorax.74
A pneumothorax is a collection of air in the chest cavity
outside of the lungs caused by a puncture to the chest wall or
lung.75 Air trapped in the chest cavity can expand and build up
enough pressure to not only collapse the lung on the injured side,
but also eventually collapse the lung on the uninjured side and
compress the heart.76 This life threatening condition requires
immediate medical attention.77  In Mrs. Morgan's case, her
pneumothorax resulted from the nerve block procedure adminis-
tered by Dr. MacPhail.78
67. 704 A.2d 617 (Pa. 1997).
68. See id. at 620.
69. See id. at 618.
70. See Morgan v. McPhail, 672 A.2d 1359, 1360 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). The spelling of
Appellee's name differs slightly between the captions of the Pennsylvania Superior and
Supreme Court opinions. Compare id. with Morgan, 704 A.2d 617 (spelling the Appellee's
name as "MacPhail"). To maintain consistency with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
opinion, the Appellee's name will hereinafter be referred to as "MacPhail" within the text.
71. See Morgan, 704 A.2d at 618 n.1.
72. See Morgan, 672 A.2d at 1360.
73. See id.
74. See Morgan, 704 A.2d at 618.
75. See HARVEY D. GRANT ET AL., BRADY EMERGENCY CARE 722 (5th ed. 1990).
76. See BRENT 0. HAFEN ET AL., BRADY PRE-HOSPITAL EMERGENCY CARE 655-56
(5th ed. 1996).
77. See id.
78. See Morgan, 704 A.2d at 618.
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Mrs. Morgan subsequently sued Dr. MacPhail alleging that he
failed to obtain her informed consent prior to performing the
procedure.79 Because Mrs. Morgan's cause of action arose before
enactment of the informed consent statute, the court was obligated
to decide her case under the common law doctrine.8' Sustaining
Dr. MacPhail's preliminary objection, the Common Pleas court
found that Mrs. Morgan's informed consent was necessary only for
surgical or operative procedures.81 Upon appeal, the Superior
Court struggled to find the logic of the surgical/non-surgical dis-
tinction under the informed consent doctrine.82 "[I]t would be less
than candid if [the court] failed to 'admit to a degree of artificiality
in creating a distinction which limits the touching required for
actionable informed consent to be the surgical cut.' 83 Affirming
the lower court's decision,' the Superior Court stated that "our
reservations regarding the injustice of this rule do not free us from
the constraints imposed upon us as an intermediate appellate
court. 85
In 1997, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered Mrs.
Morgan's appeal. 86 Noting that neither the courts nor the legisla-
ture has defined surgical or operative procedures, the Supreme
Court concluded that surgical or operative procedures involve "an
excision or incision or the use of surgical instruments., 87  The
court stated that it is the invasive nature of surgery that gives rise
79. See Morgan, 672 A.2d at 1360.
80. See Morgan, 704 A.2d at 620 n.6.
81. See Morgan, 672 A.2d at 1360.
82. See id. at 1364.
83. Id. (quoting Stover v. Association of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Surgeons, 635
A.2d 1047, 1054 n.6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)).
84. See id.
85. Id. at 1363. The court stated that its two primary functions are to apply the existing
law and "stimulate revision in the law by the highest court where reform or clarification is
necessary."
86. See Morgan, 704 A.2d at 618 (consolidating the appeal of Morgan v. MacPhail, 672
A.2d 1359 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) and Walker v. Rose, No. 4044 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)).
87. Id. at 619 (citing TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1256 (16th ed. 1989)
to provide the definition of "operate" and BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1092, 1442 (6th ed.
1990) to provide the definition of "operation" and "surgery", respectively); cf. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1442 (6th ed. 1990) ("There can never be a complete separation between the
practice of medicine and surgery; the principles of both are the same throughout, and no one
is qualified to practice either who does not properly understand the fundamental principles
of both.").
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to the need to obtain a patient's consent.' Furthermore, the
court reasoned that since a surgery patient is "typically unconscious
and unable to object," surgery without the consent of the patient
is a technical battery.89 Because the procedure received by Mrs.
Morgan did not "rise to the same level of bodily invasion as
surgery," the court affirmed the decision of the Superior Court and
maintained the surgery requirement for obtaining informed
consent. 90
In dicta, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized the
recent codification and expansion of the informed consent doc-
trine.91 Although not applicable in the instant case, the court took
a decidedly narrow interpretation of the statute by stating that it
could find no reason to expand judicially the doctrine of informed
consent only to have it overturned by the statute. 2 While the
majority in Morgan acknowledged the expanded duty of physicians
under the informed consent statute, 93 the court relied on the
underlying rationale of Gray to hold that "[i]t is the invasive nature
of the surgical or operative procedure involving a surgical cut and
the use of surgical instruments that gives rise to the need to inform
the patient of risks prior to surgery."94 Inferred by the majority's
opinion is the belief that, apart from the statutorily created
exceptions, the surgery requirement will remain as a bar to future
patients' remedies under the informed consent statute.
88. See Morgan, 704 A.2d at 620 (citing Gray v. Grunnagle, 223 A.2d 663, 668-69 (Pa.
1966)).
89. See id. at 620.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 620 n.6; see also Informed Consent, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.811-A
(West Supp. 1998). Section 1301.811-A states, in part, as follows:
(a) Except in emergencies, a physician owes a duty to a patient to obtain the informed
consent of the patient or the patient's authorized representative prior to conducting the
following procedures:
(1) Performing surgery, including the related administration of anesthesia.
(2) Administering radiation or chemotherapy.
(3) Administering a blood transfusion.
(4) Inserting a surgical device or appliance.
(5) Administering an experimental medication, using an experimental device or
using an approved medication or device in an experimental manner.
Id.
92. See Morgan, 704 A.2d at 620 n.6.
93. See id.
94. Id. at 620 (citing Gray v. Grunnagle, 223 A.2d, 663, 668-69 (Pa. 1966)).
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III. Analysis
A. Ambiguity of the Statute: Negligence v. Battery and the
Differing Interpretations of Each
Pennsylvania's informed consent common law doctrine has
traditionally framed nonconsensual treatment as a technical
battery.95 Eventually, this statute will replace the common law
doctrine as a basis for informed consent actions. Consequently, it
may be years before the court will hear arguments under the
informed consent statute.96 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
yet to determine whether the statutory cause of action will continue
under the battery theory or whether the rationale of the common
law doctrine can be incorporated into the statute.
1. Negligence-Based Informed Consent-Pennsylvania is
among "a shrinking minority of jurisdictions [that] persist in
limiting informed consent actions to invasive procedures. In those
jurisdictions, battery survives as the appropriate cause of action."'
As recently as 1999, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the
contention that failure to obtain a patient's informed consent was
an action ground in battery.98 Finding that a physician has a duty
to obtain informed consent for non-invasive procedures, the court
stated that a physician's failure to obtain consent is "better viewed
as a breach of professional responsibility than as a nonconsensual
95. See supra Part II.
96. For example, nine years had elapsed between the time of Mrs. Morgan's injury and
the court's decision. See Morgan, 704 A.2d at 617-8.
97. Matthies v. Mastromonaco, 733 A.2d 456, 460 (N.J. 1999) (citing Morgan v.
MacPhail, 704 A.2d 617 (Pa. 1997)); see also Joan P. Dailey, Comment, The Two Schools of
Thought and Informed Consent Doctrines in Pennsylvania: A Modelfor Integration, 98 DICK.
L. REv. 713, 728 & n.101 (1994).
98. See Matthies, 733 A.2d at 460.
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touching."99 These sentiments are echoed by Justice Nigro in his
dissenting opinion in Morgan.1"
Not only does a negligence-based informed consent action
comport with the notion of a physician's general duty to exercise
reasonable care for the benefit of the patient;1 1 a battery-based
action is incongruous with the traditional elements of battery."
Under a battery theory of informed consent, the physician's failure
to obtain consent lacks the malicious state of mind required to
commit a battery.103 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's willing-
ness to sustain a battery cause of action without the element of
intent was tested in Renk v. City of Pittsburgh." In Renk, the
Court stated that it was conceivable for a jury to find a person
liable for a battery under circumstances in which the person did not
99. See id.; see also Shaw v. Kirschbaum, 653 A.2d 12, 16 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994). "A
prima facie case of medical malpractice based upon a negligent act or omission requires the
plaintiff to establish:
(1) the existence of a duty owed by the physician/defendant to the plaintiff
/patient;
(2) a breach of that duty;
(3) that the breach of duty was the proximate cause of, or a substantial factor in,
bringing about the harm suffered by the plaintiff/patient; and
(4) damages suffered by the plaintiff/patient that were a direct result of the harm.
Id.
100. See Morgan v. MacPhail, 704 A.2d 617, 622 (Pa. 1997) (Nigro, J., dissenting)
(summarizing decisions and concluding that "[o]ther states have decided that a doctor's duty
to disclose the risks of medical treatment to the patient is an element of the duty of
reasonable care .... I agree that a negligence theory provides a stronger basis for the
informed consent doctrine than a battery theory.").
101. See Malloy v. Shanahan, 421 A.2d 803, 806 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (Hoffman, J.,
dissenting). Judge Hoffman further states that "the physician's culpable conduct, the failure
to inform, does not itself involve a 'touching' of the patient." Id.
102. Section 18 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS states:
(1) An actor is subject to liability to another for battery if
(a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person
or the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact,
and
(b) an offensive contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly
results
(2) An act which is not done with the intention stated in Subsection (1)(a) does not
make the actor liable to the other for mere offensive contact with the other person
although the act involves an unreasonable risk of inflicting it and therefore, would be
negligent or reckless if the risk threatened bodily harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 (1977).
103. See Malloy, 421 A.2d at 806 (Hoffman, J., dissenting).
104. 641 A.2d 289 (Pa. 1994). Renk addressed whether the City of Pittsburgh must
indemnify a police officer found liable for assault, battery, and false imprisonment. See id.
at 291. At issue was whether a jury finding of liability imports willful misconduct on behalf
of the officer, thereby eliminating the City's duty of indemnification. See id.
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act with deliberate intent.105 In dissent, three Justices maintained
that battery is an intentional tort "which requires a conscious intent
on the part of the actor to bring about the harm in question.'
10 6
In addition, under a battery theory, a physician may be liable
for punitive damages for a non-consensual touching. 7 "It would
be, however, improper to impose these sanctions upon the
physician absent a finding of wilful [sic] misconduct."' 8  Con-
versely, under a negligence theory, the patient must demonstrate
that actual harm was incurred by the non-consensual touching. 9
Finally, the Legislature's intent to use a negligence-based
approach to informed consent is apparent in the statute's Declara-
tion of Policy."0 The General Assembly stated, "that it is the
purpose of this article to streamline the legal process relating to
medical negligence lawsuits ...."1"
2. Battery-based Informed Consent-Although a negligence-
based theory of informed consent has a logical appeal, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has continued to embrace the notion
that an informed consent cause of action is ground in battery."2
If the court elects to maintain a battery standard, it must resolve
the ambiguity surrounding the application of the statute. This
ambiguity includes the extent in which the case law developed
under the pre-statute common law is applied to the actions arising
105. See id. at 293-94.
106. Id. at 294 (Montemuro, J., dissenting) (Justice Montemuro was joined by Chief
Justice Nix and Justice Flaherty). The dissent continues to cite the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 18 as support. See id. Notably, Justice Flaherty, now Chief Justice of the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court, joined the Majority opinion in Morgan rejecting a negligence-based
informed consent doctrine. See Morgan v. MacPhail, 704 A.2d 617 (Pa. 1997).
107. See Malloy, 421 A.2d at 806 (Hoffman, J., dissenting). See infra note 151
(discussing the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision to strike down provisions capping
punitive damages as unconstitutional).
108. Id.
109. See Paula Walter, The Doctrine of Informed Consent: To Inform or Not to Inform?,
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 543, 552 (1997).
110. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.801-A (West Supp. 1998).
111. Id. (emphasis added).
112. See, e.g., Morgan v. MacPhail, 704 A.2d 617, 620 (Pa. 1997) (stating that the basis
of a negligence standard "flies in the face of the traditional battery theory"). The Court's
refusal to alter the basis of informed consent is found in the presumption that statutes never
"make any innovation in the rules or principles of the common law or prior existing law
beyond what is expressly declared in their provisions." In re Holton's Estate, 159 A.2d 883,
886 (Pa. 1960); see also Witthoeft v. Kiskaddon, 1999 WL 459851, at *3 (Pa. July 8, 1999)
("This court is hesitant to infer or imply a legislative intent where the impact of such a leap
would constitute a drastic change in law.").
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under the statute. The impracticality of wholesale abandonment of
the principles of common law informed consent is obvious. Since
the Legislature essentially codified, and then expanded, the
judicially created doctrine of informed consent, the courts must
apply concepts developed under the common law to undefined
terms in the statute. For example, phrases such as "reasonably
prudent patient" and "accepted medical standards of medical
practice" necessitate an understanding and reliance on the common
law definitions."3
Furthermore, the courts must refine the rationalization that it
is the level of invasiveness, which determines a physician's duty to
obtain informed consent."' Previously, the courts limited the
level of touching required to sustain an informed consent action
under the battery theory.115 In Wu v. Spence,'16 the Superior
Court held that the intravenous administration of therapeutic drugs
was an insufficient level of touching when it was the medication
that created the harm rather than the insertion of the needle.117
In contrast, the statute explicitly requires informed consent
before the administration of radiation therapy, chemotherapy, and
blood transfusion."18  Under a "plain meaning" interpretation,
these provisions address not only the insertion of a needle, but also
include the effects of the medication and blood."9 It would be
absurd to interpret "administration" as limiting a physician's
informed consent duty to simply advising patients of the risks and
alternatives to the act of swallowing a pill, receiving an injection,
113. See generally Laskowitz v. CIBA Vision Corp., 632 N.Y.S.2d 845 (N.Y. App. Div.
1995) (finding that the New York informed consent statute did not repeal the common law
doctrine of informed consent as applied to health care providers not expressly included in
the statute).
114. See Morgan v. McPhail, 672 A.2d 1359, 1364 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (quoting Stover
v. Ass'n of Thoracic & Cardiovascular Surgeons, 635 A.2d 1047, 1054 n.6 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1993)) ("[I]t would be less than candid if [the court] failed to 'admit to a degree of
artificiality in creating a distinction which limits the touching required for actionable
informed consent to be the surgical cut.' ").
115. See, e.g., Morgan 704 A.2d at 619-20 (Pa. 1997).
116. 605 A.2d 395 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
117. See id. at 396-7; see also Karibjanian v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 717 F. Supp.
1081, 1084 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Morgan, 704 A.2d at 619-20 (citing Wu and Karibjanian).
118. See 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1301.811-A(a)(2)-(3) (West Supp. 1998).
119. The statute also requires a patient's informed consent for the administration of
anesthesia and experimental medications. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.811-A(a)(1),
(5).
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
or inhaling anesthesia.120 "Administration" can only be rationally
interpreted as also encompassing the effect of the medication or
anesthesia.1 21 Essentially, the statute no longer creates a duty of
informed consent based on the level of touching, but on what is
administered. For example, the courts will be required to find a
duty to obtain informed consent based on the type of medication
rather than an actual procedure. Therefore, the level of touching
under the pretext of a battery can be sustained through the
patient's reaction to medicine or blood rather than the invasiveness
of the procedure. The statute therefore directly conflicts with
Pennsylvania's battery-based informed consent doctrine. Therein
lies a latent ambiguity. The courts must resolve the ambiguity of
whether, under the statute, the duty to obtain informed consent
remains a cause of action grounded in battery. If a patient's
reaction to medication can satisfy the level of touching necessary
to demonstrate a battery, then the invasive nature of the surgical
requirement must be re-examined.
Either the courts must find that the statute supplants the long
held battery theory or rationalize that only certain medicines have
the potential to "touch" the patient while others do not. Although
the words of the statute may be patently unambiguous, in applica-
tion, the statute has an intrinsically ambiguous result."
3. Susceptibility of Differing Interpretations-In addition to an
ambiguous outcome, the language of the statute is susceptible to
differing interpretations. 23  The statute requires a physician to
obtain the patient's informed consent for the following procedures:
surgery and related anesthesia, radiation and chemotherapy, blood
transfusions, insertion of surgical devices and appliances, experi-
mental medications and devices, and medications and devices used
in an experimental manner.124  Without language limiting in-
formed consent to these five enumerated scenarios contained, the
statute can be reasonably interpreted to create a basis of physician
120. Under the rules of statutory construction it is presumed that the legislature did not
intend an absurd result. See Presumptions in Ascertaining Legislative Intent, 1 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 1922(1) (West 1995).
121. Cf id.
122. See In re Kritz Estate, 127 A.2d 720, 723 (Pa. 1956) ("Rules of statutory construction
are to be resorted to only when there is a patent or latent ambiguity: they [the rules] are not
to be used to create doubt, but only to remove it.").
123. See Morgan v. MacPhail, 709 A.2d 917 620-23 (Pa. 1997) (Nigro, J., dissenting).
124. See 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1301.811-A (West Supp. 1998).
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duty rather than a limitation. If the Legislature wished to limit
physicians' duty to obtain informed consent, it would have inserted
the appropriate limiting language in the statute."z Implicit in the
codification and expansion of physicians' duty to obtain informed
consent is the Legislature's obliteration of the surgical require-
ment.1 26  " '[C]ourts sometimes have been slow to extend the
effect of statutes modifying the common law beyond the direct
operation of the words, it is obvious that a statute may indicate a
change in the policy of the law, although it expresses that change
only in the specific cases most likely to occur to the mind.' ""127
This assertion is supported by Justice Nigro's dissent in
Morgan v. MacPhail.12  Dissenting from the majority's affirma-
tion of the surgical requirement, Justice Nigro reiterated the
Superior Court's contention that a surgical/non-surgical distinction
is unfounded. 129  Furthermore, Justice Nigro argued that the
Legislature has implicitly rejected such a distinction by requiring
non-surgical procedures as part of a physician's statutory duty to
obtain informed consent.13 ° Justice Nigro's inference that the
informed consent statute should be construed to eliminate the
125. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1208 (West 1992) (limiting the definition of
occupational disease for worker's compensation); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6353.3 (West
Supp. 1998) (limiting information related to reports of student abuse or injury by a school
employee); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 282(a) (West Supp. 1998) (limiting the Insurance
Commissioner's authority to temporarily certify or license agents and brokers); Pa. R.C.P.
1910.16-5(b) (limiting items to calculate monthly net income for support payments); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 36909 (West 1998) (limiting specifications to be prepared for public
building construction bids); see also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 5641 (specifying the content
of a consent for treatment of breast disease). But cf. Hoy v. Angelone, 720 A.2d 745, 748
(Pa. 1998) ("[I]t is reasonable to infer that the General Assembly's use of specific
language ... in numerous statutes reflects an intention to allow such a remedy only when
expressly provided for.").
126. See Morgan, 704 A.2d at 622 (Nigro, J., dissenting).
127. In re United Sec. Trust Co., 184 A. 106, 111 (Pa. 1936) (quoting Gooch v. Oregon
Short Line R. Co., 258 U.S. 22, 24 (1922)); see also Robert F. Williams, Statutes as Sources
of Law Beyond Their Terms in Common-Law Cases, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 554, 556 (1982)
("Courts can justifiably use statutes beyond their terms as sources of law for common-law
decision making, because the policies underlying statutes often have significance beyond the
test they inspired.").
128. See Morgan, 704 A.2d at 620-3 (Nigro, J., dissenting).
129. See id. at 622. In addition, Justice Nigro supported adoption of a negligence
standard rather than maintaining the battery theory. See id.
130. See id. In a 42-word court order, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, with Justice
Nigro's dissenting, reiterated the Morgan opinion. See Milne v. Crossett, 709 A.2d 886 (Pa.
1998).
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surgery requirement clearly demonstrates that the statute is
susceptible to differing interpretations.'
Commenting on the statute, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
appears to have used the statutory construction doctrine of
expressio unis est exclusio alteriust32 to interpret that the services
listed in the informed consent statute necessarily exclude all
others.133 This maxim, however, should not be universally applied
when it would defeat the manifest intent of the legislature."
B. Under the Rules of Statutory Construction, Pennsylvania
Courts Must Ascertain and Effectuate the Legislative Intent of
the Informed Consent Statute
Under the rules of statutory construction, 135 a court cannot
ignore the plain meaning of a statute when the words of the statute
are unambiguous. 136 Furthermore, a court cannot disregard the
plain meaning of an unambiguous statute in order to pursue its
spirit. 137  In isolation, the words of the informed consent statute
may appear unambiguous.'38 "Where, however, the statute is
unclear or susceptible of differing interpretations, 1 39 the courts
must "ascertain and effectuate" the legislative intent underlying the
statute.14°
Given the latent ambiguity of the statute and the absence of
language explicitly limiting a physician's duty to obtain a patient's
informed consent, the courts must ascertain and effectuate the
intent of the legislature underlying the statute.14' Among the
factors the court must consider are the occasion and necessity of
the act, the object to be ascertained, the circumstances under which
131. See City of Philadelphia v. Schaller, 25 A.2d 406, 409 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1942) (deter-
mining legislative intent is necessary where the statute has two or more meanings).
132. "A maxim of statutory interpretation meaning that the expression of one thing is the
exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 403 (6th ed. abr. 1991).
133. See id.; see also Morgan, 704 A.2d at 620 n.6.
134. See Knecht v. Medical Serv. Ass'n of Pa., 143 A.2d 820, 826 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1958).
135. See 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1921-1939 (West 1995).
136. See title 1 § 1921(b) (West 1995).
137. See id.
138. See PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.811-A (West Supp. 1998).
139. Pennsylvania Fin. Responsibility Assigned Claims Plan v. English, 664 A.2d 84, 87
(Pa. 1995).
140. See id.; see also title 1 § 1921(a).
141. See title 1, § 1921(c) (West 1995).
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it was enacted, the consequences of a particular interpretation, and
other statutes affecting the same or similar persons.
14 2
Once the intent of the General Assembly has been ascertained,
it cannot be ignored and must be effectuated.143 Without under-
standing the legislative intent and the policies behind the statute,
Pennsylvania courts cannot properly apply the informed consent
statute in future cases. A plain meaning application of the statute
would produce the unreasonable result of excluding physicians from
the duty of informing patients of the reasonable risks and alterna-
tives to non-surgical procedures. When the plain meaning produces
unreasonable results that are "at variance with the policy of the
Legislation as a whole" the court should follow "that purpose,
rather than the literal words."1"
C. The Objective of the Informed Consent Statute: Containing
the Cost of Medical Malpractice
The Act, focused on managing costs associated with malprac-
tice insurance financing and lawsuits,145 had two objectives: 1)
Preventing the 254 percent malpractice premium surcharge through
the CAT Fund; and 2) reforming the malpractice litigation
process.1 6 As a product of compromise between the PMS and
PTLA, the tort reform contained a number of substantive and
procedural changes to the malpractice litigation process."'
Included in these changes were the placement of reasonable caps
on punitive damages,148 discouragement of frivolous lawsuits,
149
142. See id. § 1921(c)(1)-(8); English, 664 A.2d at 87.
143. See Commonwealth v. Besch, 674 A.2d 655, 659 (Pa. 1996) (citations omitted).
144. See Swick v. School Dist. of Borough of Tarentum, 14 A.2d 898, 901 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1940) (quoting U.S. v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) (internal
quotations omitted)).
145. See Declaration of Policy, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.801-A (West Supp. 1998).
146. See S. 180-62, 2nd Legis. Sess. 2645 (Pa. 1996) (remarks of Senator Loeper); see also
title 40, § 1301.801-A. The General Assembly declared that the purpose of the statute is to
streamline the medical malpractice legal process to ensure prompt and efficient adjudication
of claims. See id.
147. See McGaw, supra note 55.
148. See title 40, § 1301.812-A (capping punitive damage awards at 200 percent of com-
pensatory damages).
149. See id. § 1301.813-A (allowing monetary sanctions against attorneys who bring
frivolous medical malpractice suits); see also id. § 1301.821-A (requiring expert review of
malpractice claims to prevent frivolous lawsuits).
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and the creation of "a realistic standard for informed consent prior
to conducting any medical procedures."''
Not only is inclusion of non-surgical procedures consistent with
the legislative history, but obliterating the surgical requirement for
informed consent is also consistent with the legislature's objective
of reducing the costs of malpractice."' An expanded informed
consent approach will encourage physicians to discuss the treatment
risks and alternatives of non-surgical procedures. This approach of
increasing physician communication is aligned with the concept that
an informed patient is less likely to sue his/her physician.'52 The
quality of physician-patient communications is associated with
general patient dissatisfaction, which in turn is correlated to the
litigation risk of the physician.'53 Therefore, increased communi-
cations between the physician and patient, via the physician's duty
150. See S. 180-62, 2nd Legis. Sess. 2645 (Pa. 1996) (remarks of Senator Loeper)
(emphasis added).
151. The efficacy of the General Assembly's reformation of malpractice litigation,
however, may never come to bear. Within 53 days of the Act's passage the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court struck down significant portions of the tort reform measures as unconsti-
tutional. See, e.g., Order of Supreme Court, Jan. 17, 1997, immediately suspending PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.812-A(d),(e),(f) (allowing, inter alia, filing of praecipe to strike punitive
damages and to bifurcate punitive damages from trial); id. § 1301.813-A (imposing a civil
penalty against attorneys filing dilatory or frivolous motions, claims, and defenses); id.
§ 1301.821-A (requiring certification of malpractice complaint by an expert). The court
invalidated these portions under authority of the Pennsylvania Constitution. See PA. CONST.,
art. V, § 10(c). See generally In re 42 PA.C.S.A. § 1703, 394 A.2d 444 (Pa. 1978) (interpret-
ing the Pennsylvania Constitution as giving the state's Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction
to establish rules of procedure for state courts and the legislature is without power to control
procedure). See also Dana Stucheli, Comment, Constitutional Crisis in Pennsylvania:
Pennsylvania Supreme Court v. Pennsylvania General Assembly. 102 DICK. L. REv. 201
(1997).
152. See LaRae I. Huycke et al., Characteristics of Potential Plaintiffs in Malpractice
Litigation, 12 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 792, 795 (1994) ("Miscommunication between
patient and provider is clearly a major contributor to calls [by patients claiming to have
suffered injury] received by attorneys."). Huycke's study identified five medical specialties
most frequently (54%) named by plaintiff patients: obstetrics, family medicine, orthopedic
surgery, emergency medicine, and general surgery. See id. at 794. The percentage of
complaints alleging failure to inform or to educate by selected specialties is as follows: obstet-
rics (8.47%), family practice (8.56%), orthopedic surgery (21.57%), and emergency medicine
(4.29%). See id. at tbl. 4. Huycke cautions, however, that although improved communica-
tion can decrease patient dissatisfaction, it is uncertain that it will reduce the risk of
litigation. See id.; cf Allen D. Spiegel et al., Better Patient Communications Mean Lower
Liability Exposure, MANAGED CARE MAG., August 1997, at 119, 121 ("As a risk
management tool, effective communication becomes a powerful way to reduce litigation and
improve patient satisfaction.").
153. See Huycke et al., supra note 152, at 796.
1999] PENNSYLVANIA'S MEDICAL INFORMED CONSENT 217
to obtain informed consent, will also achieve the goal of reducing
malpractice costs.
A study was performed measuring the relationship between
obstetricians' prior malpractice experience and patients' satisfaction
with their care.'54 Patient perceptions that obstetricians did not
explain the labor and delivery process varied greatly between
physicians with different malpractice experience.155 Finding that
physicians who have difficulty communicating with their patients
are sued more frequently, the study concluded: "[A]ddressing
patients' concerns may not only decrease the incidence of malprac-
tice litigation, but is also desirable in and of itself." '56 Generaliz-
ing the obstetrician-patient relationship, a better-informed patient
is less likely to sue. Therefore, expanding informed consent
requirements to include non-surgical procedures could actually
reduce malpractice claims with better treatment decisions and more
satisfied patients. 57 "Patients who participate in and take some
responsibility for their health decisions are less likely to blame their
physicians if something goes wrong."' 8
In contrast, proponents of a strict interpretation of the statute
may argue that limiting the patient's ability to bring an informed
consent action is the most effective method to reduce malpractice
litigation. This argument presupposes that informed consent
actions continue under a battery-based theory rather than negli-
gence.'59 Under a negligence theory, "[t]he critical consideration
154. See Gerald B. Hickson, M.D. et al., Obstetricians' Prior Malpractice Experience and
Patients' Satisfaction with Care, 272 JAMA 1583 (1994).
155. See id. at 1587.
156. Id. Only 8.3% of patients perceived that they received inadequate explanation from
obstetricians with less than average malpractice losses. See id. at 1586 tbl. 2. Obstetricians
who either were frequently sued or paid greater than average malpractice claims, were
perceived by 19.0% and 13.6% of their patients, respectively, as providing inadequate
explanation of labor and delivery. See id.
157. See Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L. J. 899 (1994) for
an excellent analysis of the informed consent doctrine. Schuck suggests that the benefits
accruing to society from greater patient autonomy may outweigh the additional time required
of physicians to explain the risks, benefits, and alternatives to treatment. See id. at 941. In
addition, Schuck suggests that a "more robust informed consent [doctrine] is needed to
counterbalance the growing bureaucratization and routinization of health care delivery." Id.
Schuck recognizes limitations of informed consent and suggests that the efficacy of the
doctrine be systematically analyzed. See id. at 959.
158. Flora J. Skelly, The Payoff of Informed Consent, 37 AM. MED. NEWS, August 1,
1994, at 11, (quoting Robin DiMatteo, Ph.D., Professor of Psychology at the University of
California at Riverside).
159. See supra Part III.A.1 (Negligence-Based Informed Consent).
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is not the invasiveness of the procedure, but the patient's need for
information to make a reasonable decision about the appropriate
course of medical treatment, whether invasive or noninvasive.""
With negligence-based informed consent, the physician's duty to
obtaining a patient's informed consent is analyzed in the context of
a "duty of reasonable care. 1 61  Accordingly, the statute would
provide physicians with a defense to informed consent cause of
actions ground in negligence. The physician would be able to
present evidence that consent was not reasonably possible,1 62 the
description, risks, and alternatives provided to the patient were
adequate,1 63 and the lack of information was of no consequence
in the patient's decision.164
Using Pennsylvania law, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
recently remanded an action in which it was alleged that the
physicians/defendants, inter alia, failed to provide information and
make the appropriate treatment recommendation to the patient's
family.1 65  The appeal followed a jury finding that the physicians
were negligent in advising the family about the patient's treat-
ment.16 The appellate court reversed the district court's decision
to disallow the physicians from submitting the issue of the family's
contributive negligence to the jury.167  This case illustrates that,
regardless of whether informed consent is negligence or battery
based, actions pertaining to the level of information provided to
patients may arise outside of the context of informed consent.
Therefore, expanding physician duty to obtain informed consent by
providing information concerning the risks and alternatives to
160. Matthies v. Mastromonaco, 733 A.2d 4456, 464 (N.J. 1999). But see Shaw v. Kirsch-
baum, 653 A.2d 12, 15 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (quoting Foflygen v. Zemel, 615 A.2d 1345, 1353
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)) ("Thus, we are compelled to analyze informed consent cases under a
battery theory until and unless our Supreme Court decides to recognize an informed consent
cause of action grounded in negligence.").
161. Morgan v. MacPhail, 704 A.2d 617, 622 (Pa. 1997) (Nigro, J., dissenting).
162. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.811-A(a) (West Supp. 1998) (relieving physicians
of the duty to obtain informed consent in an emergency).
163. See id. § 1301.88-A(b) (establishing a reasonably prudent patient standard and
permitting evidence that the physician was acting within accepted standards of medical
practice).
164. See id. § 1301.88-A(d) (placing the burden of proof on the patient to show that
receiving information of the procedure, risks, and alternatives would have been a substantial
factor in the patient's decision).
165. Alexander v. University of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr. Sys., Nos. 98-3402, 98-3501, 1999
WL 521753, at *2, *6 (3rd Cir. July 23, 1999).
166. See id. at *2.
167. See id.
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treatment offers a defense to physicians and is consistent with the
liability containment intent of the Act.
D. The Informed Consent Statute in Pari Materia: Protecting
Patients' Interests
Under the rules of statutory construction, statutes in pari
materia should be construed together as one."6 "Statutes or parts
of statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same persons
S. . or to the same class of persons." '169 Superficially, it would
appear that the entire Health Care Services Malpractice Act,
including its tort reform components and informed consent
provision, was constructed to serve primarily physicians and
attorneys. Moving to postpone consideration of the Act, Represen-
tative Vitali argued that the legislature should not simply "bow to
the special interests .... 91"0 In response, Representative Barley
stated that the people's interests are being served by this legislation
and it is reflected in their medical insurance rates and health care
services."' Therefore, it can be concluded that the citizens of
Pennsylvania, as patients and recipients of the physician's duty form
a class of persons that the informed consent statute seeks to
protect. 172  Hence, the statute should be construed with similar
patient protections afforded by the legislature and its authorized
agencies.
171
Under the Health Care Facilities Act,174 the Department of
Health ("Department") is empowered to promulgate regula-
168. See 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1932(b) (West 1995).
169. Id. § 1932(a).
170. See H. 180-62, 2nd Legis. Sess. 2453 (Pa. 1996). Representative Vitali argued that
the Bill was drafted the previous weekend by the PMS and PTLA, and only available in its
final form several hours before House debate. See id. Noting that the "bills turn on the
specific language in them and the various nuances ... ," Rep. Vitali stated that only a
"handful" of trial lawyers and physicians are aware of the Bill's content. See id. at 2453-54.
171. See id. at 2454 (emphasis added). The motion to postpone subsequently failed by
a vote of 27 to 168. See id.
172. See generally title 1 § 1932(b). Physicians may also be regarded as a class of persons
protected by the statute. See discussion supra Part III, Section C (Objective of the Informed
Consent Statute) (physician and patient interests are complementary rather than inapposite).
173. An agency's regulation "is valid and as binding as a statute upon a court" if it is
adopted pursuant to a legislative grant of rule-making power. See Girard Sch. Dist. v.
Pittenger, 392 A.2d 261, 262 (Pa. 1978) (citations omitted). It would follow that if a
regulation has the force of a statute, then the regulation should be considered with other
statutes affecting similar classes of persons under a pari materia analysis.
174. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 448.101 (West 1993).
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tions175 necessary to, inter alia, coordinate the health care system
to "enhance the public health and welfare by making the delivery
system responsive and adequate to the needs of its citizens" and to
ensure that "all citizens receive humane, courteous care. ' 176  In
doing so, the Department has created a number of health care
facility licensure regulations177 designed to protect and inform
patients of their care in settings such as nursing homes,178 hospi-
tals,179  ambulatory surgery facilities,"8  and birth centers.181
Furthermore, under the jurisdiction of the Department of Public
Welfare, patient rights have been extended to include mental
health procedures.182
The expansion of patient rights has not been limited to the
licensure of health care facilities. 3 On June 17, 1998, the Penn-
sylvania Senate approved Act 68, mandating new patient and
175. See id. § 448.803.
176. Id. § 448.102.
177. "To protect and promote the public health and welfare through ... regulations
setting minimum standards in the... operation of health care facilities. Such standards are
intended by the legislature to ... promote the health, safety, and adequate care of the
patients ... of such facilities." See id. § 448.801a.
178. See 28 PA. CODE § 201.29(g) (West 1999) (explaining that within a long-term care
nursing facility, the physician shall inform the patient of his or her medical condition and
allow the patient to participate in the planning of his or her medical treatment).
179. See id. § 119.23(b)(3) (explaining that in the hospital outpatient setting, the physician
shall inform the patient of the medical problem, prognosis, and nature and purpose of
contemplated treatment); see also id. § 103.22(b)(11) (requiring that in a hospital, a physician
inform the patient of the medical consequences of the patient's refusal of any drugs,
treatment, or procedure); cf. id. § 103.22(b)(9) (noting that in a hospital, informed consent
is required only for procedures under section 1301.811-A of the Informed Consent Act.
180. See id. § 553.12(b)(8) (requiring that at an ambulatory surgery facility, a patient
receive full information concerning diagnosis, treatment and prognosis, including information
about alternative treatments and possible complications); cf. id. § 553.12(b)(9) (noting that
in an ambulatory surgery center, informed consent is required only for procedures under
section 1301.811-A of the Informed Consent Act.
181. See id. § 501.46(b)(6) (requiring that at a birth center, a mother receive information
of the nature, purpose, expected effects, and results of the medical treatment prior to signing
an informed consent).
182. See 55 PA. CODE § 5100.54 art. 1, § l(b) (noting that mental health patients have
the right to be informed of diagnostic and treatment procedures, costs, and risks of
treatment).
183. See supra text accompanying notes 174-81; see also Advance Directive For Health
Care Legislative Findings and Intent, 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5402(a) (West Supp. 1999) ("The
General Assembly finds that all competent adults have a qualified right to control decisions
relating to their own medical care."); Resident Rights, 42 C.F.R. § 483.10(d)(2) (1999)
(stating that nursing home residents have a "right to be fully informed in advance about care
and treatment and of any changes in that care or treatment that may affect the resident's
well-being").
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physician protections under managed care plans.18' Recognizing
substantial elements of informed consent, managed care plans are
prohibited from restricting discussions between health care
providers and patients regarding the nature, risks, and alternatives
of medically necessary treatment.185
Therefore, the informed consent statute, when read in
conjunction with provider regulations and laws, should be construed
as protecting similar patient interests."8 It is apparent that the
Legislature has intended to ensure that patients are informed of the
care that they are to receive.
E. Liberally Interpreting Informed Consent: The Public Interest
in Expanding Physician Duty
The derived legislative intent of the statute can be summarized
as serving two purposes: 1) Reducing the cost of medical malprac-
tice; and 2) Protecting the interests of patients.187 To effectuate
this intent, courts must choose whether to apply the informed
consent statute in either a strict or liberal manner."8 Provided
that the Act is explicitly insurance related,"8 9 the informed con-
sent statute, passed under the Act, should receive the same liberal
interpretation that courts have applied to other insurance laws.19
In doing so, the court should construe the statute in favor of the
public interest.19'
In Miller v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., the
Superior Court considered whether the legislative intent of
184. See The Insurance Company Law of 1921 Amendments of 1998, art. XXI, sec. 2113,
§ 991.2113(a)(2), 1998 Pa. Laws 68 ("Quality Health Care Accountability Act").
185. See id.
186. See Dept. of Highways v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 182 A.2d 267, 272 (Pa.
Super. 1962) ("Statutes should be construed... so as to avoid any conflict between various
agencies ....").
187. See supra Part III.C-D.
188. See 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1928(b)-(c) (West 1995) (providing that penal,
retroactive, taxation, eminent domain, jurisdiction statutes, and provisions prior to 1937 that
are in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed, while ail other provisions
of a statute shall be liberally construed to reach their objectives and promote justice).
189. The statute was promulgated as part of a reform package to maintain the CAT Fund
and contain physician malpractice premiums. See supra Part II.B. In addition, the entire
statute falls under the jurisdiction of the Department of Insurance. See Health Care Services
Malpractice Act, PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1301.101-.1006 (West 1995).
190. See Miller v. U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 450 A.2d 91 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982);
McClung v. Breneman, 700 A.2d 495 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
191. See McClung, 700 A.2d at 497.
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Pennsylvania's Non-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act t92 allowed
the recovery of "work loss" benefits by the decedent's estate when
the administrator of the estate was not a "survivor" as defined by
the statute.193  Under Pennsylvania's rules of statutory construc-
tion, penal, retroactive, taxation, eminent domain, and jurisdiction
statutes are to be strictly construed. 194  The court stated that
because insurance statutes did not require strict interpretation,
these statutes are to be liberally construed to effect their pur-
pose.195  Adopting the Miller court's liberal interpretation of
insurance statutes, the Superior Court, in 1997, examined another
motor vehicle insurance statute.196  Holding that uninsured
motorists are precluded from recovering medical expenses from
third party tortfeasors,197 the court stated that its duty is to "give
effect to the entire statute and to favor the public interest as
against any private interest.,
198
With In re Fiori,199 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court provid-
ed assistance in identifying the public interest at stake with
informed consent. The court considered whether a close relative
of a patient in a persistent vegetative state, in the absence of an
advance directive, could remove the patient's life sustaining
treatment.20 0  Holding that the relative, with the consent of two
physicians, could remove life-sustaining treatment, the court
explicitly stated that its ruling applied only to the unique fact
pattern of the case.20' The court's analysis, however, rather than
its holding, is applicable to interpreting the public interest served
by informed consent.
Examining the common law right of self-determination,0 2 the
192. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.103 (West 1992) (repealed 1984).
193. See Miller, 450 A.2d at 93.
194. See 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1928(b)-(c) (West 1995).
195. See Miller, 450 A.2d at 97 (citing Mattia v. Employers Mut. Cos., 440 A.2d 616 (Pa.
Super. 1982)); see also 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1928(b)-(c) (West Supp. 1998).
196. See McClung, 700 A.2d at 495-97 (examining the Motor Vehicle Financial
Responsibility Law, 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1701-1799 (West 1996)).
197. See id. at 497.
198. Id. (citing 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1922(5) (West 1995)).
199. 673 A.2d 905 (Pa. 1996).
200. See id. at 908.
201. See id. at 913.
202. The Fiori court "eschewed an analysis based on constitutional principles." Id. at
909. But cf Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) ("The
Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall 'deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.' The principle that a competent person has a
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court cited the U.S. Supreme Court's recognition that "[n]o right
is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded,... than the right
of every individual to the possession and control of his person
..... 0' Attributing the development of the informed consent
doctrine to the right to be free from bodily invasion,2" the court
stated that in the absence of an emergency, " 'medical treatment
may not be imposed without the patient's informed consent.' ,9205
Tracing a corollary to this doctrine, the court found that it is
the patient's right to withdraw consent and to refuse treatment
once it has begun.26  Given the importance of a patient's right to
self-determination in regard to continuing life-sustaining treatment,
it is not without basis that the physician's duty to obtain a patient's
informed consent can be expanded to include all life saving
treatments regardless of their invasive nature.
F The Limits of a Physician's Duty to Obtain Informed Consent
Drawing upon legislative intent, coupled with a liberal
interpretation favoring the public interest, the duty of informed
consent should not be limited to examples contained in the statute.
With the increasing number of non-surgical treatments and
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be
inferred from our prior decisions."). It follows that for persons to exercise their Constitu-
tional right to refuse medical treatment, they must first be informed of the risks and alterna-
tives of the proposed treatment. If the corollary to refusing treatment is consenting to
treatment, then persons arguably have a Constitutionally derived right to be afforded the
consideration of informed consent. To exercise this right, physicians must assume the duty
to obtain the patient's informed consent before treatment. Previously, the U.S. Supreme
Court has "balanced an individual's liberty interest in declining an unwanted smallpox
vaccine against the State's interest in preventing disease." Id. (citing Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-30 (1905)). The question of whether the Commonwealth's
interest in lowering medical malpractice premiums outweighs patients' right to give their
informed consent prior to medical procedures not enumerated in the statute is saved for
another day.
203. Id. at 909-10 (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
204. See id. at 910 (citing Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914)
(Cardozo, J.). Notably, Judge Hoffman similarly quoted Schloendorff ("Every human being
of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his body."
See Malloy v. Shanahan, 421 A.2d 803, 805-6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (Hoffman, J. dissenting)
(quoting Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93)). Hoffman reasoned that the informed consent
doctrine should be grounded on negligence rather than on battery. See Malloy, 421 A.2d at
805.
205. In re Fiori, 673 A.2d at 910 (quoting Moore v. Raechle A.2d 1003 (Pa. 1992)).
206. See id.
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procedures being used in modern medicine," 7 the time has come
to expand physicians' duty to obtain informed consent. It is ironic
that the public interest in a patient's right to self-determination, as
enunciated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, is not protected
under the informed consent statute.
Courts should not construe the informed consent statute as a
bar against patients' receiving information from their physicians in
order to make an informed decision concerning non-surgical
procedures. While the purpose of requiring informed consent is to
increase patient autonomy in medical decision-making, consent
forms are symbolized as somewhat of a medical Miranda warn-
ing.2"' To change physician perceptions, informed consent should
be re-cast as recognition of "the physician's responsibility for the
well-being of the patient."2 °9 The medical profession has recog-
nized that "the patient has the right to receive information from
physicians and to discuss the benefits, risks, and costs of appropri-
ate treatment alternatives.2 0
207. See, e.g., Hospital to Use New Technique in Brain Surgery, HARRISBURG PATRIOT,
Nov. 30, 1998, at B8 (using a low-density cobalt beam to perform brain surgery without an
incision); Perspectives on the Marketplace: Assessing Medical Innovations: How Health Plans
Pick What Technology to Cover, MED. & HEALTH, May 26, 1997, available in 1997 WL
8689135 (detecting ulcer causing bacteria with an oral diagnostic solution rather than a
stomach biopsy performed in surgery center); FDA Approves Yet Another Option:
Microwave Therapy, REPORT ON MED. GUIDELINES & OUTCOMES RES., May 16, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 11666389 (using microwaves as an alternative to drugs and surgery for
treating symptoms of benign prostatic hyperplasia); Surgery Adds to Arsenal Against
Gallstones, HosP. & HEALTH NETWORKS, Apr. 5, 1990, available in 1990 WL 2630423
(noting non-invasive lithotripsy under review for potentially destroying healthy tissue).
208. See Alan Meisel & Mark Kuczewski, Legal and Ethical Myths About Informed
Consent, 156 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 2521, 2522 (1996). Concerns have been
expressed that expanding a physician's duty to obtain informed consent would excessively
strain the health care delivery system with unnecessary bureaucracy. See Gouse v. Cassel,
615 A.2d 331, 334 (Pa. 1992). Discussing the reasonably prudent patient standard of
informed consent, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that it would not be "unduly
burdensome" to require physicians to communicate "material facts, risks, complications, and
alternatives to surgery" to their patients. See id. Under this standard, only information
considered material by a reasonably prudent patient is necessary. See id. Therefore, a
balance is struck between the physician's disclosure of every possible risk and the patient's
right to medical self-determination. See id.
209. Meisel & Kuczewski, supra note 208, at 2522. The authors give this closing advice
to physicians: "Do not make [patients] think that you do not have time for them. Because
if you do, regardless of how much information they are given, they are going to be angry,
and another name for an angry patient is plaintiff." Id. at 2526.
210. Patient Right to Know: Hearings on H.R. 2976 Before the Subcomm. on Health of
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 104 Cong. (1996) (statement of John C. Nelson,
M.D., Board of Trustees of the American Medical Association and Deputy Director of the
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An expansive interpretation of the informed consent statute
would assign physicians the duty to provide patients with informa-
tion about non-surgical procedures, risks, and alternatives. 21' This
concept of duty would amount "to no more than 'the sum total of
those considerations of policy which led the law to say that the
particular plaintiff is entitled to protection' from the harm suf-
fered., 212  Pennsylvania courts, applying this duty concept "must
be guided by our recently decided cases on the same subject matter
and by our best information as to legislative intent as well as by
our sense of history, morals and justice., 211 When the policies of
misguided malpractice containment legislation "pale in comparison
to the harm at issue," the lack of a statutory duty to obtain
informed consent should not bar a patient from maintaining a cause
of action against a physician.214
IV. Conclusion
The codification of Pennsylvania's informed consent doctrine
has implicitly effaced the invasive surgical requirement. Although
unambiguous on the surface, the informed consent statute is
latently ambiguous in whether the battery-based common law can
continue to rationalize the invasiveness of the surgical requirement.
Without a battery requirement, the level of bodily invasion remains
to be determined by the courts. In view of this ambiguity, courts
should examine the statute's underlying legislative intent.
A liberal application of the statute will fulfill the intent of the
legislature. Expanding physician duties under the statute to obtain
patients' informed consent for non-surgical procedures will protect
Utah Department of Health). Dr. Nelson, speaking in opposition to HMO gag clauses,
stated that physicians have an ethical and legal duty under the Fundamental Elements of the
Patient-Physician Relation of the American Medical Association's (AMA) Code of Medical
Ethics to ensure that patients are fully informed of treatment options. See id. The AMA
Code of Medical Ethics states, "the patient's right of self-decision can be effectively exercised
only if the patient possesses enough information to enable an intelligent choice." Matthies
v. Mastromonaco, 733 A.2d 456, 463 (N.J. 1999) (quoting American Medical Ass'n, Code of
Medical Ethics: Current Opinions with Annotations, Opinion 8.08 (1981)).
211. See Morgan v. MacPhail, 704 A.2d 617, 622 (Pa. 1997) (Nigro, J., dissenting).
212. Gardner v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 573 A.2d 1016, 1020 (Pa. 1990) (quoting Sinn
v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672, 681 (Pa. 1979)). The late Dean Prosser has stated that "social ideas
as to where the loss should fall" is among factors in determining the existence of a duty. See
Dean Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REv. 1, 14-15 (1953) (quoted in Sinn, 404 A.2d
at 681).
213. Gardner, 573 A.2d at 1020-21.
214. See DiMarco v. Lynch Homes, 583 A.2d 422, 425 n.1 (Pa. 1990).
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patient interests. Furthermore, increasing communication between
physicians and patients not only improves patient satisfaction, but
it also reduces litigation by apprising patients of the risks and
alternatives to treatment. With non-invasive medical treatments
and focus on patient autonomy continuing to increase, it is time to
interpret reasonably the informed consent statute to include any
patient treatment, regardless of its nature, which involves the risk
of serious injury.
Daniel A. Durst
